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Abstract. We consider the functional and security requirements for the
information exchanges in the infrastructure for EV charging being tri-
alled in the Netherlands, which includes support for congestion manage-
ment using the smart charging protocol OSCP. We note that current
solutions do not provide true end-to-end security, even if all communica-
tion links are secured (for instance with TLS), as some data is forwarded
between multiple parties. We argue that securing the data itself rather
than just securing the communication links is the best way to address
security needs and provide end-to-end security.
Moreover, because of the number of parties involved and the fact that the
precise roles of these parties are still evolving, we argue that more data-
centric communication solutions, using pub/sub (publish/subscribe) mid-
dleware, may be better suited than using point-to-point communication
links between all parties, given the flexibility and scalability provided by
pub/sub middleware.
Key words: EV charging, congestion management, end-to-end security,
smart grids
1 Introduction
The introduction of electric vehicles (EVs) brings important new requirements
on the information and control architecture of the electricity grid. Information
needs to be exchanged for billing but possibly also for congestion management.
Charging EVs consumes a lot of electricity, a single charge of an EV consumes
roughly the same amount of energy as the daily demand of 2 to 3 houses, so
controlling it is an important means to manage the grid’s limited capacity. Fur-
thermore, EV charging may become an important factor in balancing supply and
demand. All this means that EV charging introduces a lot of information flows,
adding a lot of complexity to the ICT infrastructure behind the electricity grid.
Moreover, it involves many parties, and involves some data with high security
requirements, especially for data which is used in actively managing the grid.
Looking at the solutions currently being used or trialled in the Netherlands,
this paper considers the security requirements for data exchanged in the grid
to support EV charging in Section 3. Here we note that there are many parties
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involved in exchanging or forwarding such data. This makes ensuring end-to-end
security important, as otherwise the parties involved in EV charging have to put
a great deal of trust in one another. The importance of end-to-end security is
also stressed by standards such as IEC 62351 [15] and NIST guidelines for Smart
Grid Cyber Security [14].
We then suggest possible directions to improve the situation, both when it
comes to securing information and organising the new information flows. For
securing information, Section 4.1 discusses the possibilities to introducing se-
curity measures at the level of the data being exchanged, and not the commu-
nications links. This seems the natural way to achieve end-to-end security in
situations where data is exchanged and forwarded between multiple parties. For
organising information exchanges, Section 4.2 discusses the use of pub/sub (pub-
lish/subscribe) middleware as a solution to exchange data between many parties
that is more flexible and scalable than introducing direct communication links
between all parties involved.
These two solutions form a natural combination. Indeed, the middleware so-
lution developed in the C-DAX project (http://cdax.eu) combines them in a
pub/sub solution that provides end-to-end security tailored to smart grid appli-
cations.
Concrete starting points for this paper are the solutions that are being rolled
out and/or trialled in the Netherlands, which are described in detail in Section 2.
These include the OCPP protocol for the communication between charge spots
and operators, which is rolled out nationally, and the OSCP protocol for con-
gestion management (using so-called smart charging), which is being trialled.
The authors of this paper were involved in a security evaluation and resulting
security design of smart charging, using OSCP. The security design focussed on
achieving end-to-end integrity of data. This security design is currently being
integrated within the EV charging system in the Netherlands. Anticipating on
the roll-out of the security design, this paper aims to point out the more generic
security problems at the heart of (smart) EV charging and present some generic
solutions.
The use of EVs is still in its infancy: some solutions are still at the trial
stage and, more importantly, the market models for EV charging, and the roles
of the (many!) parties involved, are not yet clear and still evolving. However,
this will not change the basic communication needs and associated security re-
quirements. It is clear that EV charging will involve multiple parties, and some
communication between these parties with high security requirements, as it in-
volves information needed for billing, information that is privacy-sensitive, and
information needed to actively control the grid. So money, privacy, and – most
importantly – the stability of the grid are at stake. So even though we look at
the concrete protocols currently being used or trialled in the Netherlands, we
hope our conclusions will be relevant for any solution for EV charging.
Scope This paper looks at EV charging from the grid perspective rather than
the EV perspective. By this we mean that the focus is on the communication
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needs in the grid – between grid operators, charge spot operators, and energy
suppliers – to manage EV charging, and we largely ignore the communication
with the EV or its user.
Also, we will not consider the underlying physical networking infrastructure
in the field, which may include PLC (Power Line Communication), cellular net-
works such as GPRS or LTE, or CDMA1, or optic fibers for parts of the commu-
nication network. This underlying networking infrastructure may provide some
security. For example, cellular networks will provide authentication and security
at the transport level. Still, we believe that security solutions for the communi-
cation and information architecture needed to support EV charging should be
designed to be independent of the underlying networking technologies. The in-
frastructure continues to evolve and change rapidly, and different grid operators
are choosing different technologies. So, ideally solutions should not be tied to a
particular networking technology, beyond imposing minimum bandwidth and la-
tency requirements, or rely on security guarantees these technologies provide. Of
course, such security guarantees are useful additional layers of defence (following
the principle of ‘defence in depth’).
2 EV charging
This section makes an inventory of the information and communication needs for
managing EV charging, the various parties involved, and the associated security
requirements. This includes communication for billing and for management of
the grid, in particular for congestion management.
We consider the set-up and protocols that are being used or trialled in the
Netherlands, where there are public EV-charge spots where customers with the
right subscriptions can charge their EV. Still, the communication needs and se-
curity requirements are more general, and largely independent on the particular
set-up and protocols used: Any solution for EV charging that involves billing
and some form of congestion management will have similar requirements.
Fig. 1 gives a schematic overview of the smart charging set-up in the Nether-
lands. The different parties or roles involved are described below.
– The DSO (Distribution System Operator) manages a regional electricity grid,
and is responsible for a stable, reliable and well-functioning grid delivering
electricity to consumers.
– The EMSP (E-Mobility Service Provider) (re)sells electricity to EV users for
charging their car. So the EMSP will set up contracts with EV users and takes
care of billing.
– The CSO (Charge Spot Operator) operates and maintains charge spots. CSOs
play a important role in the EV market, as they interact with the DSO and
the EMSPs.
1 Alliander, one of the larger DSOs in the Netherlands, is rolling out its own CDMA
cellular network, dedicated to communication with their equipment in the field and
possibly other critical infrastructures.
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– The CSIO (Charge Spot Infrastructure Operator) is typically a vendor of
charge spots and will perform some maintenance, such as updating firmware,
on behalf of the CSO. In some situations such maintenance is only performed
through the CSO, i.e., updates are sent to the CSO and the CSO takes care
of them, but in other cases it is done directly by the CSIO.
Fig. 1 also includes the Central Interoperability Register (CIR), which is an
online customer database provided by the joint EMSPs, which can be queried
by a charge spot (via the CSO) to see if a customer is allowed to charge his/her
car.
The precise market models for EV charging are still in flux, and it is not yet
clear which parties will play which role or roles. For example, some companies
in the Netherlands play the role of both EMSP and CSO. One can also imagine
that a DSO also plays the role of CSO.
One factor here are government goals of market liberalisation and fostering
free competition in the energy sector: DSOs are natural monopolists in the region
where they manage the grid, so there will be government regulations on what
they are supposed to do and on what they are not allowed to do. However, such
concerns may be in conflict with government aims to stimulate the use of EVs
and roll-out of charge spots: as an important and resourceful party, DSOs may
have to take the lead in some domains to encourage the use of EVs.
Fig. 1. Information flows for EV charging
We now turn to the physical infrastructure involved. The charge spot (CS)
provides one or more sockets where EVs can be charged. A charge spot will
include an electricity meter for each socket, which is owned by the DSO and
controlled by the CSO. A charge spot or set of charge spots is managed by a
local controller which has a communication link, for instance a GPRS connection,
to the back-office of the CSO.
Securing the information infrastructure for EV charging 5
EV drivers with a subscription from an EMSP get an RFID card. A charge
spot also contains an RFID reader, which is used to identify an EV-driver. When
a charge starts, the charge cable is locked to the CS. The cable is only freed after
identifying with the same RFID card that was used to start the charge.
Initially, charge spots in the Netherlands also contained a smart meter, sim-
ilar to those placed in homes, which was under the direct control of the DSO,
with its own GPRS connection. For cost reasons and size reasons (removing this
additional meter allows for smaller charge spots) these smart meters are being
phased out. New charge spots only have a traditional ‘dumb’ meter per socket,
which communicates via a bus to the local controller. Even if the DSO no longer
has a direct connection to a meter in a charge spot, it will have meters in the
field, notably in the secondary sub-station that feeds a neighbourhood.
Each charging session is measured at the charge spot, and recorded at the
CSO. The details (who charged how much, where and when) are then transmitted
to the EMSP, who bills the customer. There are other billing chains, where
energy providers bill the CSO for total consumption of its charge spots and the
CSO bills the EMSP for charging of that EMSP’s customers.
2.1 Protocols
EV charging in the Netherlands uses several internationally standardised pro-
tocols, incl. OCPP for communication with the charge spots by operators, and
ISO 62196 Mode 3 for communication between EV and charge spot. A less stan-
dard solution being trialled in the Netherlands is the use of OSCP to dynamically
control the capacity made available to charge spots for the purpose of congestion
management. These protocols are discussed in more detail below.
Mode 3 ISO 62196 [9] standardises the charging of EVs, incl. the dimensions
of different plugs and allowed current and voltage. It describes four possible
modes for charging, of which the third describes EV charging at higher power
stations. This specific connection is often referred to as Mode 3, and is supported
by practically all currently available EVs.
There is a newer standard, ISO 15118 [10], that is essentially a successor of
Mode 3. ISO 15118 still needs to see a wide roll-out, as hardly any EVs on the
market support it. It includes several improvements, notably when it comes to
security, as will be discussed later.
OCPP2 The charge spot communicates with the CSO through the Open
Charge Point Protocol (OCPP). OCPP standardises the communication be-
tween the charge spot and the party that operates the charge spot (i.e., the
CSO), thereby allowing CSO back-ends and charge spots of different vendors to
communicate (preventing vendor lock-in). As part of that, OCPP also allows for
remote maintenance of charge spots by the CSO or CSIO through monitoring
and firmware updates. It also offers features needed for congestion management,
notably limiting the maximum capacity that a charge spot can deliver to an EV
in a certain time slot.
2 http://www.ocppforum.net.
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OCPP is a SOAP-based protocol3 originally designed by the E-Laad foun-
dation (http://www.e-laad.nl), a foundation set up by the joint Dutch DSOs,
but currently used by most countries that offer public charge stations. The cur-
rent release is version 1.5; version 2.0 is under development.
OSCP4 The large energy consumption of EVs poses a challenge for the
electricity grid, given the limited capacity of the power lines at local level. OSCP
(Open Smart Charging Protocol) allows a DSO to vary the capacity available
to charge stations in time, given the varying predicted capacity needed for other
consumers in an area.
This means that OSCP allows a DSO to do congestion management. Con-
gestion management is about managing the limited capacity of the grid, given
the physical infrastructure of transformers and cables, and sharing this capacity
between charge spots, households, and commercial users in a neighbourhood.5
For congestion management, OSCP supports negotiation between a DSO and
CSOs. The DSO creates a forecast, 24 hours in advance, for 15 minute intervals,
on the power usage for each cable, based on historic measurement data and
weather forecasts. The DSO then divides the forecast power usage among CSOs,
again using historic data and contracted capacity. Using OSCP, each CSO is
informed of its allotted capacity and the remaining spare capacity. The CSO can
negotiate for more or less capacity, again using OSCP. The CSO then creates
a charge plan for the charge spots, specifying the limit of the power they can
supply per time slot, and transmits this to the charge spots using OCPP.
There is an important trust assumption here on the part of the DSO, that
the CSO will not consume more energy than it negotiated, as there is no way
for the DSO to limit the energy flow, other than a tripping safety breaker on the
cable, which would stop the electricity supply to all consumers on this cable.
2.2 Security requirements
Any discussion of security is meaningless without considering the security re-
quirements. A coarse classification in four overall security requirements can be
made:
1. Availability of electricity Clearly availability of electricity is of paramount
importance. Both the availability and the integrity of information could af-
fect the electricity supply, namely if the absence or incorrectness of informa-
tion could hamper operation of the grid.
3 A JSON over websockets version (version 1.6) of OCPP is currently being developed.
4 http://www.smartcharging.nl/smart-charging/open-smart-charging-protocol
5 Congestion management should not be confused which load balancing, which is
about the more general issue of getting demand and supply in balance. The limited
capacity of the grid is a (constant) factor here, but so is the variation in the supply
of electricity – variation which will increase as there is more use of renewables (solar
and wind power). So congestion management is always a local issue, and involves
imposing limits on demand, whereas load balancing is also an issue on larger scale,
and may involve influencing both demand and supply.
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2. Integrity and non-repudiation for billing For billing integrity of the
records of the charging is important. Some form of authentication of EVs
or EV users will be needed for this. One may also want some form of non-
repudiation, i.e. some evidence to settle disputes, say in case a customer of
an EMSP disputes her bill. Non-repudiation is related to integrity, but, as we
will see later, some measures to ensure integrity (notably the use of secure
tunnels) do not provide a practical means to support non-repudiation.
3. Privacy Confidentiality of information about an individual EV is important
for the privacy of its user, as it for instance reveals the location where an
EV was at a given time. Given that the user of an EV is typically a single
person, such information will be personal information, and hence subject to
legal requirements on the handling of personal information.
4. Business confidential data Some of the companies involved may consider
some of their data confidential for business reasons. For example, a CSO
might not want its competitors to know how busy it’s charge spots are, and
an EMSP might not want its competitors to know customer information.
A more thorough evaluation of the security requirements, which would also in-
volve the formulation of attacker models, is beyond the scope of the paper. Still,
we do want to point out that EV charging introduces new players in the market,
notably CSOs, that play an active part in congestion management and can affect
the first security requirement above.
Here the introduction of smart EV charging seems to bring bigger risks than
the introduction of smart metering. Smart meters also give new parties access to
ICT infrastructure in the grid (for instance new service providers that read out
metering data), but these are not meant to play an active part in managing the
grid, as CSOs are expected to do in smart charging. Of course, this is not to say
that smart meters are without risks to the availability of electricity, esp. if the
smart meters allow consumers to be disconnected remotely [2]. A feature that
was removed from smart meters in the Netherlands after a security evaluation.
Security risks can be mitigated at different levels: at the level of the ICT
infrastructure, but also at the level of the application or service, as explained
below.
1. At the level of the ICT infrastructure, risk to availability can be mitigated
by redundancy, say by having back-up storage of critical data, or having a
second communication link if a link fails. Risks to integrity and confiden-
tially can be mitigated by various forms of access control, authentication, or
the use of cryptographic checks, (i.e. digital signatures or message authenti-
cation codes (MACs) for integrity and encryption for confidentiality). Note
that these are generic security measures, largely independent of the specific
application. Of course, which measures and costs are reasonable will always
depend of the specific application.
2. Independent of these more generic techniques at the level of the ICT infras-
tructure, it may also be possible to mitigate risk by more tailored measures
at the level of the application. One such a measure is having fall-back scenar-
ios. For example, when the management of the grid uses smart charging as a
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way to do congestion management, there may be a fallback option on what
to do if this system fails; a charge spot might have some default capacity
that it will use in case it does not receive a dynamic capacity.
The security measures we discuss in the remainder of this paper will be of the
former kind, but this does not mean one should overlook measures of the latter
kind.
3 Security shortcomings
It appears that security considerations have not played a very prominent role in
rolling out the public charge spots in the Netherlands, or indeed in the design of
the OCPP protocol. The OSCP protocol is still under development and has had
a security evaluation on an initial functional design. While not exactly security-
by-design, the early inclusion of a security evaluation is already a marked im-
provement on the design of OSCP over OCPP. This security evaluation yielded
several security issues, not just in the OSCP link, but in the whole EV-charging
chain, as discussed in more detail below.
3.1 Weak authentication
At public charge spots drivers authenticate themselves using an RFID card.
Surprisingly, only the static ID (the so-called UID) of the card is used for au-
thentication here. In essence, this means every customer is identified through a
password that is transmitted plaintext through the air. This makes copying the
cards extremely simple: on legitimate RFID cards the UID is fixed and cannot
be changed, but counterfeit cards with a configurable UID and equipment that
can spoof the RFID communication are readily available.
The UID can be eavesdropped if one has access to the card by simply using
a standard NFC-enabled phone. With electronic equipment it is also possible to
eavesdrop on the UID when it is used at a charge spot. This is possible at a
distance of several meters [6, 7], but it would be simpler to stick eavesdropping
equipment right on top of the RFID antenna of a charge spot. An attacker could
also simply try out random UIDs until he finds one that the charge spot accept;
by reading out the UID of a few legitimate cards it will be easy to determine
the approximate range of UIDs used for EV charging.
That cloning cards is so easy does not necessarily mean there is a viable
criminal business model. Blacklisting cloned cards can frustrate fraudulent use
of cloned cards, at the expense of also creating hassle for innocent victims who
had their card cloned. The real deterrent to fraud would probably be the risk
that users of the cloned cards run of being caught red-handed. Especially since
charging electric cars still takes a significant amount of time.
However, the weak authentication could be exploited to release the expensive
charge cables, which in the Dutch setup are owned by the EV-driver.
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3.2 Reliance on secure tunnels
As a security measure, the OCPP specification suggest the use of TLS to secure
communication links. In practice, this suggestion may not be followed because
of bandwidth restrictions (charge spots generate very small messages, where
introducing TLS increases the overhead significantly) and cost: charge spots
often communicate over cellular networks, and the use of this communication
link will be charged per transmitted byte, making the overhead extra costly.
This means that these OCPP links then rely on the security offered by the
underlying cellular technology.
Note that even if TLS is used to protect both the OCPP and the OSCP links,
this still has some security shortcomings: it would not always provide true end-
to-end security, and it would not provide a practical means for non-repudiation,
as explained below:
Lack of end-to-end security Some of the information for smart charging
is forwarded across multiple links. For instance, measurement data generated at
the charge spot meter should end up at the EMSP, so they can bill the customer
accordingly. The CSO forwards the data received from the charge spot to the
EMSP.
Even if both the communication links are protected by TLS, this does not
provide end-to-end security between the charge spot and the EMSP. The TLS
tunnels will prevent against tampering at intermediate points between the charge
spot and the CSO, and at intermediate points between the CSO and the EMSP,
but the CSO will have to be trusted not to change the data. The same goes for
metering data that goes from the charge spot to the DSO, or, conversely, for the
charge plans that go from the DSO to charge points.
To summarise: TLS does provides a secure tunnel, but only for one commu-
nication link, and not across multiple links.
Lack of non-repudiation TLS ensures the integrity of the data sent be-
tween two parties: Message Authentication Codes (MACs) are added to any data
sent and upon reception these are checked to rule out tampering with the data.
As soon as data exits the TLS tunnel, all these integrity measures are stripped -
what is left is the original data that was sent. This has the advantage of making
the data protection completely transparent. But a downside is that there is no
easy way for the receiver to later prove the integrity of the message to a third
party. The only way to do this would be to provide a log of the entire TLS
session, including the TLS handshake, which is hardly practical.
4 More data-centric solutions
This section discusses directions to address the security shortcomings of secure
tunnels above, and to provide more flexibility and scalability in handling the
information flows between the many parties involved in EV charging. These
directions are related in that they revolve around letting the data itself, rather
than the communication links, play a central role.
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4.1 Data-centric security
By data-centric security we mean providing security at the level of data messages,
rather than at the level of the communication links. To illustrate the idea, we
will first look at how integrity of meter readings in charging sessions is ensured
in ISO 15118.
ISO 15118, the successor standard for Mode 3, provides built-in security
measures that address some of the security concerns discussed in Section 3.2
above. In ISO 15118 metering data can be digitally signed by both the car
and the charge spot. This means that the ultimate recipient of the data, say
an EMSP, can verify that the data record comes from a particular customer
and a particular charge spot. In case of any disputes, the digital signatures
provide evidence that a particular EV was involved in charging. So this provides
non-repudiation and end-to-end security, more specifically end-to-end integrity,
between EMSP, charge spot and EV.
Note that these guarantees do not rely on any secure tunnels for the com-
munication, and that the CSO does not have to be trusted not to change the
data. The fundamental difference is that the security is added to the data mes-
sages themselves, and not to the communication channels over which the data
is transferred.
More generally, similar to the way that ISO 15118 provides integrity checks
on certain messages, data integrity and confidentiality of data messages can be
handled at the level of individual messages using the same standard crypto-
graphic mechanism: integrity of messages can be guaranteed using either digital
signatures or MACs, and confidentially of messages can be handled by encryp-
tion.
These solutions overcome the limitations of generic secure tunnels discussed
above in Section 3.2: they can provide end-to-end security, even for data for-
warded between multiple parties, and provide non-repudiation, as messages come
with their individual integrity checks.
4.2 More flexible architectures using pub/sub middleware
Adding security measures at the level of the data, as discussed above, rather
than at the level of the communication links, opens up the possibility of using
more flexible architectures to share data across multiple parties, as we will now
discuss.
As shown in Fig. 1, the EV charging infrastructure requires a lot of communi-
cation links between various parties. In fact, the situation is more complex than
Fig. 1 suggests: the figure only shows one DSO, CSO, EMSP, and one charge
spot, whereas in reality there will be several DSOs, CSOs, and EMSPs, not to
mention charge spots.
Organising communication links between all of these parties can be a chal-
lenge. One way to keep it manageable is to introduce some intermediaries or
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message brokers. Indeed, Fig. 1 already includes the CIR as a central interme-
diary acting on behalf of all EMSPs to allow a CSO to access client information
irrespective of the EMSP.
A more structural way of organising information links between many parties
is the use of a middleware solution such as pub/sub, short for publish/subscribe.
This is a message-oriented middleware solution which provide a central ‘data
hub’ that allows many parties to provide (aka publish) or receive (aka subscribe
to) information.
Pub/sub middleware offers advantages of flexibility and scaling. It readily
supports one-to-many communication as well as one-to-one communication. It
does require a consistent data model to be shared between all parties, but in
bilateral connections between individual parties data models have to be syn-
chronised as well.
In the EU project C-DAX, a pub/sub information middleware solution [4]
tailored to the smart grid has been developed. The solution has been inspired by
and partially built on code of the earlier SeDAX system [11]. Although conceptu-
ally one can think of the C-DAX middleware as one central data cloud in which
all the information is received and forwarded, as shown in Fig. 2, in reality this
data cloud can be distributed over various geographical locations (for example
to take into account bandwidth restrictions). Data may also be replicated across
various locations to provide higher levels of resilience.
The C-DAX middleware also provides security mechanisms to provide confi-
dentiality and/or integrity of messages, depending on the needs of the applica-
tion, using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography [8].
In using a pub/sub middleware solution to organise the information streams
for EV charging there are still many configuration possibilities. For example, it
may be useful to let EVs or their owners access data in the data cloud or provide
data to the cloud. And instead of charge spots directly accessing the data cloud,
one could also choose for a solution where they still only provide or obtain data
via the responsible CSO.
Fig. 2. C-DAX as pub/sub middleware for EV charging
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5 Related work
Whereas we look at the communication infrastructure and associated security
requirements from the grid perspective, most of the literature on the communi-
cation infrastructure for EV charging, such as [3], takes the EV perspective, and
for instance considers ways in which EVs – or their drivers – could communicate
with the grid and what information would then be exchanged.
The idea to use pub/sub middleware solutions for smart grid application
is not new. An overview of middleware solutions for smart grid applications,
including pub/sub solutions, is given in Section 6 of [1]. One of the pub/sub
solutions discussed there, the SeDAX system [11], provided the starting point
for the pub/sub solution developed in the C-DAX project.
This overview in [1] does not consider the specific scenario of EV charging.
Rivera et al. do explore the use and advantages of pub/sub middleware for EV
charging, for a more specific goal of optimising distributed EV charging [13].
6 Future work
The Dutch ElaadNL foundation is working on implementing a specific security
design for smart charging, which focusses on end-to-end integrity of meter read-
ings and stronger authentication of EV drivers.
We have not considered interaction with the user and/or the EV yet. This
could be in the form of communication between the EV and the charge spot,
to communicate wishes for charging, e.g. using ISO 15118 [10], but it could also
involve communication between the user, e.g. using a smartphone app, and the
EMSP.
One important aspect that we have not considered in this paper is privacy.
How to take privacy into account in designing the overall information and com-
munication infrastructure is an important issue. One interesting option to inves-
tigate is the use of privacy-friendly aggregation techniques as have been success-
fully applied for smart metering in homes [12, 5], where certain parties can then
only see aggregate usage.
7 Conclusions
There were two observations that motivated us to write this paper. Firstly, we
observed that the solutions that are being rolled out or trialled for EV charging
do not provide true end-to-end security across the whole communication chain
of the various parties involved. Given the small scale of EV charging, security
may not be much of an issue yet, as the stakes involved are relatively small. But
a danger is that retro-fitting security afterwards when these initiatives do grow
to larger scales will be difficult. Indeed, it is widely recognised that it is best
to practice Security by Design, and take security into account from the earliest
stages of any design.
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Secondly, we noted that when security is being considered, the security solu-
tions largely relies on the use of secure communication tunnels. This is the case
for both OCPP and OSCP. While using secure communication tunnels is a good
step, and using standard solutions such as TLS is then the wise thing to do, it is
important to realise that this may not take care of all security needs: as we argue
in Section 3.2, TLS can secure a communication link between two parties, but
it will not provide end-to-end security if data is forwarded between parties, and
even when it is used between two parties it does not provide practical support
for non-repudiation.
We considered two compatible directions for organising and securing the
communication needs associated with EV charging: (i) adding security measures
at the level of the data, and not just at the level of the communication links,
discussed in Section 4.1, and (ii) using middleware solutions such as pub/sub
that provide a more flexible way of connecting the many parties involved in EV
charging, discussed in Section 4.2.
W.r.t. (i), given that the management of EV charging involves forwarding
communication between multiple parties – including DSOs, CSOs and EMSPs
– the right way to tackle security seems to be secure the data being exchanged,
and not (just) secure the communication channels over which the data is com-
municated (e.g. using TLS). We were pleased to note that the newer ISO 15118
standard does provide security guarantees in this way, by having charging records
digitally signed by both the charge spot and EV.
W.r.t. (ii), given the number of parties involved, and the fact their roles
and business models are still evolving, solutions where all these parties have
to bilaterally exchange data may not be practical. Having some central party
to collect data and/or coordinate the exchange of data may be a more scalable
approach. An interesting analogy here is the exchange of metering data. For this,
the DSOs in the Netherlands have set up a joint organisation, called EDSN, to
provide a central intermediary for exchanging metering data between DSOs and
energy suppliers. EDSN was set up well before the introduction of smart meters,
to facilitate billing by energy suppliers who have customers served by different
DSOs. One can envisage a similar solution for the exchange of EV charging data.
One way to realise this is through the use of pub/sub as a middleware solution.
The pub/sub middleware solution developed in the EU FP7 project C-DAX
demonstrates that such middleware solutions are feasible even in high-volume,
low latency applications and with high guarantees for resilience [4].
Irrespective of whether the solutions we propose are ultimately the best or
even feasible, a broader aim of this paper is to raise awareness and encourage
debate about ICT and security issues surrounding EV charging. We have only
discussed the way EV charging is organised in the Netherlands. Presumably
there will be similar initiatives in other countries. By sharing information on
how this is organised, there may be much that initiatives in different countries
can learn from each other here.
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